The chart on page 105 sets out the positioning
of Simon’s total target compensation against the
FTSE 75-125 group, for both 2025/26 and once
LTIP awards revert to the normal level. The chart
illustrates the impact of the steps we have taken
to reasonably and responsibly address the
previous market shortfall.
Shareholder engagement
We have a well-established commitment to
engaging with our shareholders on executive
pay. This year, in respect of the development
of the new Policy and how we will implement
it for 2025, we undertook an extensive
multi-phased consultation process. The first
phase of this engagement involved meeting
with a handful of our very largest shareholders,
comprising just over 36% of the share register,
to test the initial thinking on key elements of
the proposed framework.
Building on the feedback received from this first
phase, we then broadened our engagement to
the remainder of our top 30 shareholders, and
as a result, consulted with c. 86% of the register
in total, broadening the coverage from previous
Policy consultations. As part of the second
phase we undertook 14 shareholder meetings
and received feedback from another four
shareholders. We also engaged with the major
shareholder representative bodies.
Overall, shareholders were supportive of our
approach. There was a clear understanding of
the challenges we face on remuneration and
acknowledgment of how we were seeking to
address these in a robust and responsible way.
Shareholders were supportive of the removal
of the J2G LTIP Award and the transition of
our LTIP towards the hybrid structure, with
many welcoming the continued commitment
to performance from the weighting of the two
elements. A number of shareholders appreciated
the Committee’s recalibration of the market
reference point from FTSE 50-100 to FTSE 75-125
and were generally supportive of proposed salary
increases and incentive opportunities.
Feedback we received informed the Committee’s
approach in a number of areas:
– Our initial proposal sought to remove the
PBT ‘underpin’ from the Annual Incentive
framework on the basis that the stretch in the
target ranges provided sufficient safeguard
for shareholders. However, we now propose
to retain the underpin in the Policy, which is
indicative of our approach to ensuring pay
outcomes reflect performance, an area in which
we have a strong track record.
– We took on board the range of shareholder
feedback we received on a number of aspects
of the calibration of the hybrid performance
framework. For example, there was a range of
views on the approach and types of factors to
consider for the Restricted Shares underpin.
On the proposed change to the TSR group
for the Performance Shares, again we tested
different approaches and heard a range of
views with many shareholders understanding of
the challenges we face in constructing a robust
sector peer group and therefore supportive of
the switch to measuring against the FTSE 350.
– Some shareholders wanted to better
understand our approach to the ‘haircut’, which
we have provided on page 109 which illustrates
the process we followed in materially reducing
award sizes from the previous Policy, and then
calibrating the Restricted Share element using
a 50% haircut.
The Committee acknowledges that it did receive a
diverse range of views and inputs and can confirm
that all feedback was taken into account in
finalising proposals. The Policy, and how we intend
to implement it for the year ahead, represent a
balanced outcome from its consultation process
and are right for the business at this stage of
its development.
On behalf of the Committee, I would like to thank
all those shareholders for their engagement
during this process. We will continue to engage
openly with our shareholders on executive
remuneration moving forward.
As usual, we will set stretching performance
targets for all performance measures which will
be disclosed retrospectively in next year’s report.
Executive Directors will be eligible for a maximum
award of 150% of salary and one-third of any
earned amount will be deferred into shares for
two-years, both unchanged under the new Policy.
Before any incentive pay out, a threshold level of
adjusted PBT will need to be achieved.
In 2025, subject to shareholder approval, we
will operate the ‘hybrid’ LTIP structure discussed
above for the first time. The Performance Shares
will be based on an equal mix of adjusted EPS
and TSR performance, supported by the ROCE
underpin as usual. Taking account of internal
forecasts over the performance period, the
challenging market conditions in which the Group
operates, our long-term growth ambitions and
the expectations of the investment community,
the adjusted EPS targets are considered to be
appropriately stretching. For the TSR element,
performance will be measured against the
constituents of the FTSE 350 index, of which
the Group is a constituent, excluding financial
services and energy companies. We believe this
simple, objective and market-aligned approach
is more robust than a bespoke group given the
Group’s limited number of directly comparable
listed peers.
The Restricted Share award will be subject to a
robust underpin. Full details of the performance
targets and underpins are set out on page 114.
The Committee carefully considered the award
sizes for the first awards under the new Policy.
Kate will receive awards at the normal level as
described above (i.e. Performance Shares of
170% and Restricted Shares of 40% of salary).
In determining Simon’s award size for 2025, a
number of factors were taken into account by the
Committee, all related to ensuring that the CEO
is fairly rewarded for his work to date and that
he is appropriately incentivised and engaged to
continue his strong leadership for the next phase
of our strategic delivery.
First, it is important to recognise the strong
contribution that Simon’s leadership has delivered
during his tenure as CEO, which, as flagged in last
year’s remuneration report, the Committee does
not believe has been sufficiently captured in his
remuneration outcomes to date (for example –
the lapsing of the J2G LTIP Award, other ‘in-flight’
LTIP awards being largely ‘underwater’, and the
forfeiture of the 2023/24 Annual Incentive as a
result of a sustained period of challenging market
conditions which triggered the profit ‘underpin’
for the year). Combined with the relatively low
positioning of salary, and the Committee’s
decision on the CEO’s appointment to defer
reviewing the 2022 Policy and its relevance,
this has created a market shortfall in total
compensation received compared to the strategic
progress achieved (as highlighted on page 107)
over the last two years. Looking forward, it is also
critical to ensure that management are retained
and motivated to accelerate value creative
growth and the continued effective execution of
our strategy. In this competitive global market
for experienced and high calibre leadership
talent, a key aspect of this is to ensure there
are reasonable but effective long-term equity
awards to drive retention and alignment. Simon’s
shareholding of 154% of salary is as a result of his
personal investment in the Group.
Having reflected on these factors and after
consultation with shareholders, the Committee
concluded that granting awards at the maximum
levels allowable under the Policy for 2025 would
be the most effective way to mitigate these risks
and achieve our objectives. We therefore intend,
on this occasion, to utilise the flexibility under
the new Policy to grant Simon’s 2025 awards as
a Performance Share award of 250% of salary
and a Restricted Share award of 100% of salary.
The Committee’s intention would be that, having
now normalised the packages of both Executive
Directors, awards in subsequent years would
revert to the normal award levels described on
page 114.
Directors’ Remuneration report continued
RS Group plc Annual Report and Accounts 2025110